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Abstract - New techniques such as Searchable Encryption are being deployed to enable data to be encrypted online. Searchable 
Encryption is now at the point that it can be deployed and used within the Cloud.  In the Cloud, Searchable Encryption has the ability to 
allow CSP customers to store their data in encrypted form, while retaining the ability to search that data without disclosing the 
associated decryption key(s) to CSPs that is, without compromising data security on the Server. We present an SSE scheme and 
evaluate the efficiency of storing and retrieving data from the cloud. The results showed that carrying out a task using SSE is directly 
proportional to the amount of information involved.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The benefits of Cloud computing are significant: reduced costs, 
high reliability, as well as the immediate availability of additional 
computing resources as and when needed.  Despite such 
advantages, Cloud Service Provider (CSP) consumers need to be 
aware that the Clouds poses its own set of unique risks that are not 
typically associated with storing and processing one’s own data 
internally using privately owned infrastructure [1, 2].   Perhaps the 
most severe risk facing CSP consumers at present is the threat of 
data disclosure or data loss.  Recent years have seen a number of 
such incidents occur, whereby organisations customer data – 
hosted on the Cloud - has been leaked online (for hacktivism or 
vandalism purposes) or stolen for criminal purposes.  Cloud 
computing is made possible through the use of many technologies, 
including internet access, virtualisation and third party data 
centres.   
 
In the case of online access to the CSP, such access controls 
typically take the form of usernames and passwords; In the case of 
virtualisation, such access controls typically take the form of 
logical data separation; and in the case of third party data centres, 
such access controls typically take the form of physical access 
controls (For Example: Locks, Keypads) (as well as software 
based access control) that prevent unauthorised CSP personnel 
from gaining access to user data.  In principle, all of the 
aforementioned access controls are sound; however in practice, 
such controls have been circumvented. In the event that any of the 
aforementioned access controls are compromised maliciously, the 
chances of a data breach occurring are high.  Should a data breach 
occur and the associated data is retrieved in encrypted form, the 
data is essentially useless to an attacker (unless the encryption 
algorithm utilised is weak and/or the attacker has some 
foreknowledge of the associated decryption key) [2, 3]; however, 
in the event that a data breach occurs and the associated data is 
retrieved in plaintext form, an organisations worst nightmare has 
become a reality.  What follows is typically a slew of press 
releases, negative publicity, damaged business reputations, and 
fines under various data protection laws [4, 5] . To reduce the 
impact of potential data breaches (and to provide privacy for CSP 
consumer data) CSPs typically employ the use of cryptography.  
In a Cloud environment, cryptography is typically utilised for two 
purposes: security while data is at rest; and security while data is 
in transit.  Unfortunately the Cloud cannot guarantee the security 
of data during processing as the current limitations of 
cryptography prevent data from being processed in encrypted 
form. Given the fact that data is processed in unencrypted form, it 
is quite common for attackers to target data in use, rather than 
targeting data which is encrypted during storage and transit. An 
entity wishing to store its data within the Cloud must choose to (1) 
Store Data in Encrypted Form or Store Data in Unencrypted 
Form. If storing data in encrypted form then 2 Options exist which 
are to 1. Disclose Decryption Key(s) to Cloud Service Provider 
(CSP) or 2.  Keep Decryption Key(s) Private. 
 
Option 1A requires encrypted data owners to disclose their 
decryption key(s) to CSPs.  This is due to the fact that data cannot 
be searched or operated on while in encrypted form.  In order to 
provide CSP customers with such functionality, CSPs require 
access to the necessary decryption key(s).  Option 1B (Keeping 
Decryption Key(s) Private) represents the most secure sub-option; 
however, as previously mentioned, CSP customers lose the ability 
to search or operate on their data while it is in encrypted form.  In 
order to utilise such functionality using Option 1B, CSP 
customers must download their data, decrypt it, and only then can 
it be searched and/or operated on.  While this approach may be 
fine for small amounts of data, it becomes increasingly inefficient 
and unwieldy as the amount of data increases.  In addition, should 
any changes be made to the data after it has been downloaded; the 
customer must then re-encrypt and re-uploaded the entire dataset 
to the Cloud. Option 2 avoids the use of encryption for data 
security.  Rather than relying on cryptography for data security; 
that is, the traditional approach to data security, this approach 
utilises the aforementioned approach of logically separating data 
  
 
 
[6]. Evidently, none of the options available at present provide an 
adequate balance of data security and functionality.  Option 1A 
and Option 2 offer full functionality at the expense of data 
security, while Option 1B provides data security at the expense of 
any and all functionality. The ideal solution to achieving an 
optimal balance of data security and functionality within the 
Cloud involves the CSP having the ability to search and operate 
on data while it is in encrypted form – without having any 
knowledge of the associated decryption key(s), or the associated 
plaintext(s)  [6].  
 
SSE represents one of the few forms of Searchable Encryption 
that is achievable using established standardised encryption 
algorithms.  Alternative forms of Searchable Encryption require 
the use of non-standardised, special purpose encryption 
algorithms [7]. SSE is considered one of the least secure forms of 
Searchable Encryption (see figure 1) primarily due to Information 
Leakage [9, 11].  Solutions exist to eradicate and obfuscate all 
forms of Information Leakage in SSE; however existing solutions 
have a significant effect on the search efficiency of SSE [18].  
Evidently, the challenge for researchers is to improve the security 
of SSE while maintaining its superior search efficiency. Figure 1 
lists all known solutions to the problem of searching on encrypted 
data; that is, symmetrically encrypted data, as well as public key 
encrypted data.  The y-axis of figure 1 lists all Searchable 
Encryption solutions with respect to their efficiency, while the x-
axis lists all solutions with respect to security.  As regards 
efficiency, the SSE literature defines efficiency as the time-
complexity associated with finding a given Encrypted Search 
String (ESS) within a body of encrypted data (expressed in Big O 
Notation).   
 
 
 
Figure 1: Efficiency Vs.  Security Trade-off For SE Schemes (Kamara 2013) 
 
In terms of security, the SSE literature defines security as the 
amount of Information Leakage associated with using a given 
Searchable Encryption scheme; that is, what the Server learns (or 
can deduce) about the ciphertext by searching over it (expressed 
in Terms of the numerous categories of Information Leakage) 
[19]. 
 
 
 
II. SEARCHABLE ENCRYPTION 
 
Searchable Encryption operates on the assumption that a given 
Term - whether in plaintext form or encrypted form - is located in 
the same position in both the plaintext version of the Document 
and the encrypted version of the same Document.  For Example:  
Given a plaintext Document beginning with the Term ‘The’, the 
description provided by [8] assumes that the first three characters 
of both the plaintext version of the Document and the encrypted 
version of the Document correspond to the Term ‘The’.  
Essentially this description assumes that symmetric ciphers 
encrypt data one character at a time, when in reality, this is not the 
case. Modern symmetric ciphers encrypt data in blocks of a fixed 
size, rather than character by character [19]. The effect of using 
such ciphers is that the ciphertext associated with a given plaintext 
Term is spread across the entire ciphertext block, rather than 
appearing in the same position as the plaintext Term; thus 
preventing traditional Sequential Searching. In addition, modern 
symmetric ciphers typically operate using advanced block cipher 
modes (another mechanism to counter cryptanalysis) which 
‘chain’ the ciphertext of previously encrypted blocks to the 
current plaintext block (by means of a bitwise XOR operation); 
thus further complicating the problem of searching ciphertext for 
the presence of an encrypted version of a plaintext Search String. 
Recognising the inherent difficulty in achieving Searchable 
Encryption as originally described by [8], subsequent work in the 
area focussed on developing solutions to the problem as originally 
conceived; albeit without actually using Sequential Searching 
[16].  Specifically, researchers focussed on adapting the Inverted 
Index – a mechanism that has been used in plaintext Information 
Retrieval for decades – for use in Searchable Encryption [12, 13].   
In its most basic form, an Inverted Index is a Data Structure that 
maps Terms to the Document(s) they occur in; therefore 
eradicating the need to Sequentially Search Documents [15].  
When adapted for use with an encrypted Document Collection, 
the resulting Inverted Index is titled Searchable Symmetric 
Encryption (SSE) [12, 14]. 
 
The topic of Information Leakage forms an Integral part of SSE.  
When the idea of Searchable Encryption was first proposed, one 
of its founding principles was the assumption that the Server 
storing the encrypted Document Collection is an adversary that is 
actively working on subverting the security of the Document 
Collection it possesses (with the ultimate goal of gaining access to 
the Document Collection in plaintext form) [8]. As such, the SSE 
Inverted Index is constructed and operates in a manner that takes 
significant steps to reduce the Leakage of potentially useful 
Information to the Server.  In practice, this involves the use of 
encryption for the Document Collection, the Lexicon, Posting 
Lists and Search Strings; as well as the use of Data Structures that 
hinder the Servers efforts in achieving its malicious goals [12,16]. 
 
Responsibility for creating the SSE Inverted Index is offloaded to 
the Client.  In order for the Server to construct the SSE Inverted 
Index, decryption keys must be disclosed to the Server (as 
mentioned previously, this is undesirable from a data security 
perspective).  Rather than reveal sensitive information to the 
Server, SSE delegates responsibility of constructing the SSE 
Inverted Index to the Client.  Given that the Client is responsible 
for constructing the SSE Inverted Index, it is therefore expected 
that the Client forwards the SSE Inverted Index to the Server 
  
 
 
along with the encrypted Document Collection whenever the latter 
is forwarded to the Server for storage [16].   
 
The steps involved in constructing an SSE Inverted Index are 
exactly the same as those involved in constructing an IR Inverted 
Index, albeit the Client has responsibility for generating the SSE 
Inverted Index, and various forms of encryption are applied to 
each dataset after they have been compiled; that is, the Document 
Collection, the Lexicon and the Postings List [16, 17]. In addition 
to the use of encryption, a different Data Structure – namely, an 
Array - is utilised to store Postings instead of a Linked List (as is 
used in the IR Inverted Index) [12].  
 
An Inverted Index as typically utilised in plaintext Information 
Retrieval (IR) contains Data Structures commonly used to store 
the three data sets that make up the Inverted Index, as well as 
what form of computer memory is typically used to store each 
Data Structure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rather than storing Lexicon Terms in plaintext form, SSE requires 
that a keyed-hash of each Term be stored instead [10, 20]. The use 
of a keyed hash function for this purpose - instead of traditional 
reversible encryption - may seem curious at first; however 
researchers have successfully argued that the Lexicon’s sole 
purpose within the Inverted Index is to provide the Client with the 
ability to carry out searches and nothing more.  Given that the 
Lexicon is unlikely to be downloaded to the Client (and is 
therefore unlikely to be decrypted - unlike the actual Documents), 
the use of reversible encryption for encrypting Lexicon Terms has 
largely been abandoned. Aside from the aforementioned reasons, 
the use of a keyed hash function for this purpose has a number of 
advantages in terms of reduced Information Leakage and 
improved data security, including the following [19]. 
 
 First and foremost, the use of a hash function (keyed or non-
keyed) ensures that all encrypted Lexicon Terms within the 
SSE Inverted Index are of equal length (a hash function 
produces a Hexadecimal String of fixed length); therefore 
masking the length of all underlying plaintext Lexicon Terms. 
   
 Secondly, the use of a hash function (again, keyed or non-
keyed) ensures that an adversary has no means of decrypting 
the encrypted Lexicon Term back to its plaintext form.   
 
 Thirdly, ensuring that a keyed hash function is used – instead 
of a traditional non-keyed hash function – protects SSE from 
Rainbow Table Attacks; that is, pre-computed Hash Values of 
common Dictionary Words. 
 
The use of Linked Lists for Posting List storage is abandoned in 
SSE due to Setup Leakage resulting from their modus operandi; 
that is, sequential memory access, with Arrays being preferred 
instead [12].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Specifically, given the first Link in a Linked List, it is a trivial 
process to examine all subsequent links due to the fact that each 
Link in a Linked List contains a pointer to the next Link. Given 
that each Term in an IR Inverted Index has its own dedicated 
Linked List to store Postings; it is therefore a trivial process to 
derive the Term-Document Frequency (TDF) for each Term in the 
Lexicon in advance of the associated Term being searched for. 
 
Rather than using one Array for each Term in the Lexicon (doing 
so would also result in TDF Storage Leakage; that is, the size of 
the Array would be equivalent to the TDF), SSE utilises a single 
one dimensional Array to store all Postings for all Terms (see 
figure 3). Utilising this approach, Setup Leakage amounts to the 
total number of Postings for the entire Lexicon; that is, trivial 
Leakage. 
 
Figure 2: Inverted Index Visualisation (Including Data Structures and Memory 
Management 
  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Postings Stored In an Array. 
 
Given that all Postings are now stored in a single one dimensional 
Array, some mechanism to keep track of what Postings belong to 
what Terms is therefore required.  The solution to this problem is 
relatively similar to a Linked List, albeit the solution involved 
does not utilise pointers (as is the case with Linked Lists). In order 
to keep track of what Postings are associated with a given Term, 
SSE requires that the Document ID of the first Posting associated 
with a given Term is stored alongside the keyed-hash of the Term 
in the Lexicon Hash Table (in RAM) (For Example: Doc ID 1).  
Alongside this Document ID (in the Lexicon Hash Table) is an 
Array Index denoting the location of the second Posting 
associated with the Term (For Example: 94).  At the Array Index 
in question is the Document ID of the 2
nd
 Posting, as well as the 
Array Index denoting the location of the third Posting (For 
Example: 79). 
 
From the Research Results presented in [10] it is apparent that the 
search time associated with SSE is impressive – to the point that 
one could argue SSE is efficient enough to be deployed in a Cloud 
environment. In addition, the work of Cash et al. (2013) proves 
that SSE does indeed scale to large Data Sets whilst maintaining 
its search efficiency, and also has the ability to support 
Boolean/Conjunctive Queries in an efficient manner whilst 
maintaining Data/Query Privacy. Despite such impressive Results, 
we believe both papers focussed on the performance of a single 
component of SSE; that is, searching an SSE Inverted Index, and 
not SSE as a whole.  Specifically, the author feels that both papers 
have glossed over the topic of SSE Inverted Index Construction.  
Given that constructing an SSE Inverted Index is a necessary pre-
requisite to searching an SSE Inverted Index; the author feels the 
topic deserves significantly more attention than that which it has 
been given in the published literature thus far.   
 
[10] cover the topic briefly, however as indicated previously, the 
Results presented are somewhat skewed by the fact they only 
include the Results of converting a pre-existing IR Inverted Index 
into an SSE Inverted Index – the Results do not include the time 
taken to generate the initial IR Inverted Index. [11] make no 
mention of the time taken to generate the SSE Inverted Index used 
in their work. In addition to largely ignoring the process of 
constructing an SSE Inverted Index, both papers have also ignored 
the process of transferring the SSE Inverted Index and the 
encrypted Document Collection from the Client to the Server.   
 
As [10] correctly points out, the time taken to transfer both the 
SSE Inverted Index and the encrypted Document Collection from 
the Client to the Server will vary depending on the underlying 
system [10] failed to cover this part of SSE for this reason); 
however the author personally feels that the same can also be 
argued in relation to cryptographic operations (which are of 
course reported on in detail in both implementations). 
 
When discussing their Results in relation to searching an SSE 
Inverted Index, both Kamara et al. (2012) and Cash et al. (2013) 
readily acknowledge that their Results only cover searching the 
SSE Inverted Index and decrypting the Postings associated with 
the Lexicon Term being searched – their Results do not include 
the time associated with retrieving and forwarding matching 
Documents to the Client – another essential component of SSE. 
In addition to their failure to examine SSE as a whole, the author 
is also somewhat disappointed in the quality of information 
relating to the Test Data Sets and findings of both papers. In 
relation to Test Data, table 1 summarises the Test Data statistics 
published (and not published) in both papers.   
 
Information Disclosed Kamara et 
al. (2012) 
[10] 
Cash et al. 
(2013) [11] 
Number of Documents In 
Data Set 
No Yes 
Number of Terms In Data 
Set 
No No 
Number of Unique Terms 
In Data Set  
No Yes (Enron 
Data Set Only) 
Number of Postings In 
Data Set  
Yes 
(Postings In 
Media File 
Data Set Not 
Disclosed) 
Yes (Postings 
In Census Data 
Set Not 
Disclosed) 
Number of Postings 
Associated With Highest 
Frequency Lexicon Term  
No Yes (Not 
Disclosed For 
Media File 
Data Set) 
Size of Test Data Set Yes Yes (Size Of 
Census Data 
Set Not 
Disclosed) 
 
Table 1: Test Data Statistics 
 
The total number of Terms in the Data Set is relevant in that it 
dictates the amount of work needed to be performed during 
Document Tokenisation; that is, IR Inverted Index Construction, 
the number of unique Terms in the Data Set is relevant in that it 
dictates the number of Terms contained within the Inverted Index 
(both the IR Inverted Index and the SSE Inverted Index),  while 
the number of Postings in the Data Set is relevant in that it 
dictates the number of Postings contained within the Inverted 
Index (both the IR Inverted Index and the SSE Inverted Index).  
 
The number of Postings associated with the highest frequency 
Lexicon Term is relevant in that the Term in question is typically 
used to measure the worst case scenario of searching an SSE 
Inverted Index, while the size of the Test Data Set is relevant in 
terms of transmitting the Document Collection to the Server from 
the Client.  As can be seen from  table 1, a number of these 
statistics are not disclosed (or are only partially disclosed) by the 
respective authors; therefore making it difficult to give context to 
the associated experiment results. 
 
In relation to Inverted Index Construction statistics,  
Table 2 summarises the Test Data statistics published (and not 
published) in [10] and [11]. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Information Disclosed Kamara et al. 
(2012) 
Cash et al. 
(2013)  
Time Taken To Generate IR 
Inverted Index 
No No 
Size Of IR Inverted Index No No 
Time Taken To Convert IR 
Inverted Index To SSE 
Inverted Index 
Yes No 
Size of SSE Inverted Index No Yes 
Time Taken To Encrypt 
Document Collection 
Yes No 
 
Table 2: Inverted Index Construction Statistics 
 
The time taken to generate the IR Inverted Index is significant in 
that the processing time is linear in the number of Terms 
contained within the Document Collection.  The time taken to 
generate the SSE Inverted Index is significant in that the 
processing time is linear in the number of Postings contained 
within the IR Inverted Index, while the size of the SSE Inverted 
Index is relevant in terms of transmitting the SSE Inverted Index 
to the Server from the Client. 
 
As can be seen in table 2, neither [10] or [11] disclose any 
information in relation to IR Inverted Index Construction.  When 
reporting the Results of converting their IR Inverted Index to an 
SSE Inverted Index, [10] choose to do so by charting their Results 
against the size of the Test Data Set (in MB)
1
.  Personally the 
author feels this information would be much more informative if it 
were charted against the number of Postings in the Test Data Set, 
given that the size of the underlying Data Set in no way reflects 
the number of unique Terms or Postings in the Data Set.  For 
Example: a 10MB DOCX file may contain the same Term 
repeated over and over again; that is, one unique Term => one 
Posting.  In addition, the author feels that the use of the Document 
Collection size here is a poor choice given the fact that different 
file formats can contain the same number of words, but differ 
greatly in size (such a TXT Files and DOCX Files)
1
.  
 
III. EVALUATION 
 
We have therefore identified a number of issues with the 
information available regarding existing implementations of SSE.  
The existing SSE literature has failed to cover the whole spectrum 
of activities associated with SSE [20].  Additionally, the existing 
published literature has yet to examine the usage of SSE when 
deployed in a Cloud computing environment. In relation to RQ2, 
the existing published literature has only compared the 
performance of SSE with a Database Server, and not a traditional 
plaintext IR system that utilises an Inverted Index [11].  
 
                                                          
 
1 It should be noted that the chart in question also includes encrypting the 
associated Document Collection (which is of course dependant on the size of the 
underlying Document Collection); however the time associated with executing this 
portion of the task represents only a fraction of the time associated with generating 
the SSE Inverted Index. 
Both software artefacts are examples of personal file hosting 
applications.  Like all file hosting applications, the objective of 
both the “PlainTXT Storage and Search Engine” and “CipherTXT 
Storage and Search Engine“ is to allow service users to store their 
files in the Cloud, and to access/retrieve those files as and when 
needed (via a web browser). In the case of the “PlainTXT Storage 
and Search Engine” application, users will be able to store their 
personal files in plaintext form, as well as having the ability to 
search and retrieve those files by forwarding queries to the 
application in plaintext form. In the case of the “CipherTXT 
Storage and Search Engine” application, users will be provided 
with the exact same functionality as the “PlainTXT Storage and 
Search Engine” application, with the exception that both user’s 
files and queries are encrypted prior to being forwarded to the 
application for storage/usage.  
 
Given the prototype status of both applications, a number of 
standard features and functionality typically associated with 
personal file hosting services have been classified as out of scope 
for the initial version of both software artefacts.   Both the 
“PlainTXT Storage and Search Engine” and “CipherTXT Storage 
and Search Engine“ applications were implemented using the Java 
Programming Language.  All Client-Side functionality associated  
with both applications was implemented in the form of Java 
Applets, while all Server-Side functionality was implemented in 
the form of Java Servlets. The SSE scheme underlying the 
“CipherTXT Storage and Search Engine” application is [10].   
 
The Operating System was Windows Ultimate 64-Bit SP1. The 
Java Development Kit (JDK) was v.8 and JRE was update 51, 
build 16. The Web Server (Localhost) was Apache Tomcat 7.0.56. 
Tests were run on an Intel Core i7 4900MQ @2.8GHz Quad Core 
laptop with 24GB RAM (3 X 8GB KINGSTON DDR3 @ 
800MHz). The Hard Disk was a 925GB SSHD with RAID 1. All 
tests were conducted using the default Java Virtual Machine 
(JVM) - no additional runtime parameters were configured. All 
experiments were performed on the ’20 Newsgroups’ Data Set 
(Rennie, 2008). In its original form, the ’20 Newsgroups’ Data Set 
consists of 18,828 files, subdivided into 20 folders.  Initially, each 
file in the Data Set has a numeric file name between 4 and 6 digits 
in length with no file extension. Prior to being used in the 
experiments, we first attempted to move all files in the Data Set 
into a single folder; however at this point we noted that the names 
of all files in the Data Set are not unique (the contents of each file 
are unique however [21]. In an effort to avoid duplicate file 
names, we randomly assigned an 8 digit numeric name to each file 
in the Data Set.  We also appended the TXT file extension to each 
file in the Data Set. As part of Testing, we tested each aspect of 
SSE with Data Sets that increased in size by an order of 
magnitude.  As such, it was necessary to derive smaller subsets 
from the full ’20 Newsgroups’ Test Data Set.  In total, 5 subsets 
were derived (DS1 – DS5).  The details associated with each 
subset – and the full Data Set (DS6) – can be seen in table 6. We 
present the results associated with SSE Inverted Index 
Construction, SSE Inverted Index Searching and the comparison 
of SSE and plaintext Information Retrieval (IR). All results 
represent average values obtained over ten executions of each 
experiment. 
 
SSE Inverted Index Construction 
  
 
 
The time associated with constructing an IR Inverted Index 
appears to increase linearly as the number of Terms in the 
underlying Document Collection increases.  In relation to Test 
Data, an IR Inverted Index was generated for Test Data Set 6 
(approximately 5 million Terms) in approximately 7.6 seconds.  
 
 
Performance of SSE vs. Plaintext IR 
We found that the amount of time necessary for SSE uploading 
increases in a non-linear manner when compared to the amount of 
time necessary for plaintext IR uploading. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Plaintext IR Querying vs. SSE Querying 
 
 
 
Figure 4 denotes the comparison of traditional plaintext 
Information Retrieval (IR) querying and SSE querying.   The 
Experimental Results presented in figure 4 consist of the time 
taken to identify the set of all Postings associated with the most 
frequently occurring Lexicon Term in the underlying Document 
Collection, and encapsulating the set of all matching Document 
within a ZIP File which is then returned to the Client.   It is 
obvious from  figure 4 that the amount of time necessary for SSE 
querying increases in a non-linear manner when compared to the 
amount of time necessary for plaintext IR querying. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Java Heap Memory Usage and Garbage Collection Statistics for SSE 
Inverted Index Construction 
 
 
In relation to searching an SSE Inverted Index, the results provide 
additional proof of the efficiency of SSE when implemented in 
software.  The implementation of SSE developed as part of this 
research was able to identify and decrypt a single Posting 
associated with a given Lexicon Term in approximately 22 
microseconds (μs).  This performance is comparable with the 
implementations of SSE developed by Kamara et al. (2012) which 
was 7.3 Microseconds (μs) per Posting and Cash et al. (2013) 
which was 100 Microseconds (μs) per Posting.  Regarding the 
efficiency of constructing an SSE Inverted Index, the results are 
somewhat inconclusive.  Given the five steps involved in 
constructing an SSE Inverted Index, each step in the 
implementation of SSE produced as part of this research 
performed as expected with the exception of the second step: 
Converting an IR Inverted Index to an SSE Inverted Index.   
 
For Test Data Set 1 (DS1) through Test Data Set 4 (DS4), an SSE 
Inverted Index was generated from an existing IR Inverted Index 
in a time linear to the number of Postings stored in the IR Inverted 
Index; however, for DS5 and DS6, this apparent linear 
performance decreased dramatically.  This decrease in 
performance could be attributed to a combination of one or more 
of the following: 1) The Java Virtual Machines (JVM) Garbage 
Collection functionality, 2) Insufficient Java Heap memory, 3) 
The use of String Objects in the Encrypted_Array_Node Class, 4) 
The size of the SSE Inverted Index, and 5)  
 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The results show that carrying out a task using SSE is directly 
proportional to the amount of information involved.  In the case of 
constructing an IR Inverted Index, the results show that the time 
taken to generate an IR Inverted Index is directly proportional to 
the number of Terms contained in the underlying Document 
Collection.  Converting the same IR Inverted Index to an SSE 
Inverted Index is directly proportional to the number of Postings 
contained within the IR Inverted Index, while the time taken to 
encrypt the underlying Document Collection is directly 
proportional to the number of Terms contained within the 
Document Collection.  In relation to searching in SSE, the time 
taken to identify and decrypt the set of Postings associated with a 
given Lexicon Term is directly proportional to the number of 
Postings.  Regarding the question of whether or not SSE is 
efficient enough to be deployed in a Cloud environment, the 
answer is context dependant. If deployed in an environment 
whereby Search Results only have to be returned to the user in 
small quantities (such as an Internet Search Engine (For Example: 
ten results at a time)), then SSE would be more than efficient, 
irrespective of the size of the underlying Data Set (due to the fact 
that only a small number of Postings would need to be decrypted 
at a given time). If deployed in an environment whereby all results 
must be returned at once (as was the case with the implementation 
of SSE developed as part of this research, SSE would only be 
suitable for small and medium sized Data Sets. 
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